I agree with you to a certain extent but, there has been some "chatter of lntel" of late that alludes to the "bear" is working on subs similar to the AIP system type from Germany that has long range capabilities. Here is the Chinese version of an AIP model the "Yuan Type 039A/B" which has similar design features of the Russian Kilo's, and the incorporation of AIP technology (Air Independent Propulsion = Solid state Fuel Cell system ) that is also used in the German, Italian, Israeli and other Navy subs that use this system of propulsion.

Here are some of the specs on the Chinese sub in question:

Type 039A/B (Yuan Class) Diesel-Electric Submarine
Type 039A/B (Yuan Class)

The Type 039A/B, codenamed Yuan Class by the NATO, is a new type of non-nuclear submarine introduced by the PLA Navy in 2004. The submarine was built by Wuchang Shipyard in the inland Hubei Province. The Type 039A is reportedly China’s first submarine to be incorporated with an advanced air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, which enhances the submarine’s underwater performance and reduce its vulnerability to detention.

The Yuan Class appears to be a mixture of Chinese indigenous designs and Russian influence, with four diving planes and a single large shaft. The teardrop shaped hull and large sail suggest heavy Kilo influence. A pair of foreplanes are positioned in the middle of the sail. The hull of the submarine is covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduce the risk of detection.

It was reported that the Yuan Class was equipped with an indigenously-developed AIP system, which allows the submarine to remain submerged on battery at slow speed for days or even weeks without having to surface to recharge batteries. The tactical flexibility, small size, and inherent stealth of such a system offers conventional diesel-electric submarines a remarkable increase in capability, making them dangerous threat to conventional and even nuclear submarines. It is believed that the AIP system used by the Type 039A may be a 100 kilowatt Stirling-cycle heat engines with external combustion design, developed by the 717 Institute of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC).

The submarine has six 533mm bow torpedo tubes (2 above, 4 below), which can launch a range of Chinese indigenous or Russian wire-/acoustic-/wake-homing torpedoes, as well as the 80km-range YJ-82 submarine-launched anti-ship missile. For mine warfare missions, the submarine can carry 18~24 mines in its torpedo tubes.

The first-of-class hull No. 330 was launched on 31 May 2004, but its commission may have been delayed due to technical difficulties. Construction of the second hull began in 2006 and the submarine was launched in 2007. The two boats differ in the sail design and water holes arrangement.

Shiplist
No.   Name   Shipyard   Fleet   Launch   IOC   Variant
330   ?   Wuchang   South Sea   31 May 04   ?   Type 039A Yuan Class
?   ?   Wuchang   -   2007       Type 039B Yuan Class
?   ?   Wuchang   -   2007       Type 039B Yuan Class
?   ?   Wuchang   -   2008       Type 039B Yuan Class

Last update: 23 February 2009.

http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/yuan.asp

These are some of the specs of the Russian Kilo Class - Their version in 1994:

Kilo Class (Project 636/877EKM) Diesel-Electric Submarine
Project 636 Kilo Class

The Kilo class is the diesel-electric submarine designed by St. Petersburg-based Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau. It is intended mainly for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW) roles, and is also capable of general reconnaissance, water mine laying and patrol missions. There are three variants in the Russian Navy service: Project 877, Project 877K, and Project 877M. The Project 877EKM was the early export variant with reduced features. The Project 636 is a follow-on development of the former with reduced noise level and increased underwater speed.

The PLA Navy ordered two Project 877EKM submarines from Russia in 1994, and they were delivered in 1995. In 1996 the PLA Navy became the first foreign customer for the improved Project 636 submarines with two boats of this variant ordered from Russia. These boats were delivered in 1997 and 1998. All four Kilo class submarines are deployed in the submarine base of the East Sea Fleet at Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province near the Taiwan Strait.

In 2002, the PLA Navy signed a US$1.5 billion deal with the Russian state arms export agency Rosoboronoexport to purchase eight more Project 636 submarines. In May 2002, the Russian news agency Itar-Tass confirmed that construction on two units of the eight Project 636 submarines for the PLA Navy was to begin during the first quarter of 2003 at the Severodvinsk Shipyard. Follow-on units of the class will be built at Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard in St. Petersburg (five units) and at Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard in Nizhniy Novgorod (one unit). Delivery of these submarine began in 2005 and was completed by 2007.

The PLA Navy reportedly experienced some mechanical problems with the Kilo class submarines due to insufficient crew training, and more constantly because of the material problems including the troublesome batteries and generators. The first two Project 877EKM submarines were said to be out of operation for several months due to technical problems. As the PLA Navy gets more efficient in operating the submarine, these problems are likely to be solved.

The purchase of additional Kilo class submarine reflects the PLA Navy’s urgency to build a modernised underwater force that capable of supporting its military actions against Taiwan and deterring any intervention by the U.S. Navy. It also reflects the incapability of China’s indigenous shipbuilding industry to fulfil the navy ’s requirements, which forced the Chinese military planners to look elsewhere for a solution.

The Kilo class submarines features a water-drop shape double hull with a T-shape stern rudder and a single large shaft. A pair of bow planes are located close to the midship on the upper hull in front of the sail. With a reserve buoyancy of 32%, the submarines consists of six watertight compartments separated by transverse bulkhead in a pressured double hull, which increases the survivability of the submarine, even with one compartment and adjacent ballast tanks flooded. The command and control and fire-control systems are located in the main control room which is sealed off from other compartments.

To reduce the submarine’s acoustic signature, the flooding ports are removed from the forebody, and the hull is covered with rubber anti-sonar protection tiles to reduced the risk of detection. The improved Project 636 has more powerful diesel generators, but with a lowered speed main shaft, which provides a substantial reduction in the acoustic signature of the submarine.

The Project 877EKM has a displacement of 2,300t when surfaced and 3,950t submerged. The Project 636 has a extended hull with slightly larger displacement. The maximum diving depth is 300m. The surface speed is 11 knots and the underwater speed is 20 knots. The personnel onboard total 52, and the submarine has an endurance at sea of 45 days.

The submarine's propulsion system consists of two diesel generators, a main propulsion motor, a fuel-economic motor and a single shaft driving a seven-blade fixed-pitch propeller. There are two additional stand-by motors for running in shallow waters, at mooring and in cases of emergency. Two 120-cell storage batteries are installed in the first and third compartments of the submarine. The main machinery is equipped with an automatic control system.

Systems

The Project 877EKM is equipped with a combat information system consisting of a multi-purpose MVU-110EM computer which allows for five targets to be tracked simultaneously, with two automatically and three manually. The Andoga navigation system feed the course and speed data into the combat data system.

The Project 636 features an improved C4ISR system with a high speed computer capable of processing information from the surveillance equipment and display it on the screen. It can also automatically determine the surface and underwater target data and calculate firing parameters, provide automatic fire control, and provide information and recommendation on the manoeuvres and deployment of weapons.

The Project 877EKM is fitted with a MGK-400 Rubikon (Shark Teeth) dual-channel sonar providing echo target ranging, detection of active sonar signals, and underwater communication. The Project 636 has an improved MGK-400EM digital sonar with better performance.

The submarine is also fitted with an MRK-50 (Snoop Tray-2) active surface search radar working in periscope and surface modes to provide information on the underwater and air situation, radar identification, and navigational safety.

Countermeasures include electronic support measures (ESM), radar warning receiver and direction-finder.

Weapons

The Kilo class submarine has six 533mm torpedo tubes in the bow section of the first compartment. The six tubes are in two rows, with two on top and four at bottom, all capable of launching torpedoes and laying mines. The two outbound tubes at the bottom can also launch TEST-71MKE TV electric homing torpedoes. The two upper tubes can be used to launch the 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missile.

The submarine’s weapon compartment can accommodate 18 torpedoes, with six in the launch tubes and 12 on the weapon racks. If the submarine does not carry any torpedo, it can deploy 24 mine.

The anti-submarine TEST-71MKE remotely controlled torpedo has an active sonar homing system with TV guidance which allows the operator to manually switch to an alternative target, and can maneuver in two axes. The torpedo weighs 1,820kg with a 205kg explosive charge.

The unique wake-homing 53-65KE torpedo is designed to attack surface targets. It weighs 2,200kg with 200kg explosive charge. It has a range of up to 40km, and a depth of search of up to 500m.

The Kilo class can be fitted with a launcher for eight Strela-3 (NATO codename: SA-N-8 Gremlin) surface-to-air missiles, but those in service with the PLA Navy are not equipped with this system.

The eight newer Project 636M submarines are equipped with the Klub-S missile complex, which can fire the Novator 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missile. The missile has a maximum range of 220km and a 450kg high-explosive warhead.

Shiplist
No.   Shipyard   Fleet   Launch   IOC   Type
364   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   East Sea   1994   1995   Project 877EKM
365   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   East Sea   1995   1995   Project 877EKM
366   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   East Sea   1996   1997   Project 636
367   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   East Sea   1997   1998   Project 636
?   Severodvinsk Shipyard   ?   2004   2005   Project 636
?   Severodvinsk Shipyard   ?   2004   ?   Project 636
?   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   ?   27 July 05   ?   Project 636
?   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   ?       22 Dec 05   Project 636
?   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   ?       Dec 05   Project 636
?   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard   ?       June 06   Project 636
?   Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard           June 06   Project 636
?   Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard           2007   Project 636

Specifications

Designer: Rubin Central Maritime Design Bureau
Builders: Admiralteyskiye Verfi Shipyard; Severodvinsk Shipyard; Krasnoye Sormovo Shipyard
Crew: 52
Length: (Project 877EKM) 72.9m (Project 636) 73.8m
Beam: 9.9m
Draft: 6.3m
Displacement: (Surfaced)(Project 877EKM) 2,300 tonnes (Project 636) 2,350 tonnes
Displacement: (Dived)(Project 877EKM) 3,950 tonnes (Project 636) 4,000 tonnes
Speed: (Dived) 20 knots; (surfaced) 11 knots
Diving depth: (Operational) 240m (Maximum) 300m
Endurance: 45 day; 6,000 miles with snorkel @7 knots; or 400 miles submerged @3 knots
Ship-to-ship missiles: 3M-54E inertial cruise + active radar homing to 220km, warhead 450kg, sea-skimming
Torpedoes: 6 X 533mm bow tubes, 24 weapons; TEST-71MKE remotely controlled torpedo with active sonar homing + TV guidance; warhead 205kg; or 53-65KE wake-homing to 40km; warhead 200kg
Mines: 24~36 in lieu of torpedoes
Radar: MRK-50 (Snoop Tray-2) surface search
Electronic countermeasures: Radar warning receiver
Sonar: (Project 877EKM) MGK-400 Rubikon (Shark Teeth) hull-mounted, active/passive search and attack, medium frequency; (Project 636) MGK-400EM digital sonar
Arrangement: Diesel-electric
Propulsion: 2X diesel generators; 1X main propulsion motor; 1X fuel-economic motor; Single shaft driving a seven-blade fixed-pitch propeller

Last update: 23 February 2009.

http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/sub/kilo.asp

This is probably what you're referring to BOZAK TWO1:

Diesel-Electric Submarines, the U.S. Navy’s Latest Annoyance

April 2008

By Grace Jean 

Anti-Sub TechnologyThe Navy in recent months has had to contend with several provoking episodes at sea — Iranian small boats speeding at its cruisers, destroyers and frigates; Russian bombers flying over its carriers; and Chinese subs shadowing its warships.

Hard-to-detect submarines — such as quiet, diesel-electric boats — are particularly vexing, Navy officials say. They contend that an undersea arms race already has begun in the western Pacific.

Nations there in recent years have begun to acquire stealthy diesel-electric submarines. Some of those nations, say Navy officials, could one day threaten U.S. access to strategic coastal areas of the world or interrupt the flow of commerce around the globe.

Although the Navy has the world’s most technologically advanced fleet — including state-of-the-art nuclear attack submarines — officials acknowledge that these comparatively low-tech diesel-electric boats could give an enemy an asymmetric advantage.

“The beauty about a diesel submarine is that it has the potential to be far quieter than a nuclear submarine,” says Guy Stitt, president of AMI International, a Bremerton, Wash.-based company specializing in naval market analysis. Diesel boats are propelled by batteries when submerged and move through the water by diesel engines when on the surface.

Once they have powered up their batteries, the submarines can sail to the bottom of coastal waters and remain undetected for days. Though they can’t travel long distances or sail very quickly, advancements in technologies, such as air-independent propulsion and fuel cells, have allowed diesel submarines to extend their operational ranges underwater.

But perhaps their best selling point is their relatively inexpensive price tags. The Russians have sold diesel submarines for as little as $200 million and the French have exported their Scorpene submarines for $300 million.

“It is within the scope of many, many countries to be able to afford them. They don’t need a lot of them. They don’t need to sail them very far, and they don’t have to be particularly proficient with them,” says Vice Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of the Navy’s Third Fleet, which prepares strike groups to deploy to the Pacific and the Middle East.

More than 39 nations possess diesel submarines. One of the latest tallies indicates a total of 377 ships in the world, says Richard Dorn, an analyst at AMI International. And there could be an uptick in the next few years.

With China continuing to increase the size of its navy, a number of neighboring nations also have begun to develop their undersea capabilities.

“There’s a push on in Asia that really seems to be driven by China,” says Stitt. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia all have closed deals on diesel submarines, and now Thailand is following suit.

Driving the market in part is Russia, which during the past 18 months has been aggressively selling ships, including its Kilo-class diesels.

“We’ve seen a huge increase in the number of sales that they’re booking for Kilos, primarily motivated by the need for funds to strengthen their second tier shipbuilding groups,” says Stitt.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has lost many of its secondary shipyard suppliers — the engine, pump and valve manufacturers, piping companies and the like. But Russia is attempting to revitalize those small companies.

“They’re going out and making all these deals to sell submarines and ships and using those funds to reinvigorate the industry, which in turn will also benefit them in building up the Russian fleet,” says Stitt.

Russia has exported 30 Kilos around the globe and 26 are still in active service. It will deliver two more submarines to Algeria by 2010, five to Venezuela by 2020, and six to Indonesia by 2018. China received its 12th and final Kilo last year.

The number of Kilos that are being sold is particularly concerning because many of the submarines are equipped with Klub anti-ship cruise missiles.

Some nations have a desire for regional hegemony and want to strengthen their influence in an area. That’s most definitely the reason for President Hugo Chavez buying subs for Venezuela, says Stitt.

But for other nations, the reasons are less clear.

“There’s a wide array of military assets you can buy, so why would you buy a diesel-electric submarine? As far as I know, it’s not to protect your own port,” says Locklear in an interview at Third Fleet headquarters perched atop Point Loma in San Diego.

That China’s submarines are surfacing boldly near U.S. warships is a telltale sign of newer advanced technologies, such as acoustic tiles and cavitation-reducing propellers, that are being employed on the submarines, says Stitt.

China’s new Song-class diesel submarines have tracked U.S. Navy ships operating in the seas near Japan and Taiwan. Last November, after China denied the USS Kitty Hawk’s port call in Hong Kong at the last minute, a Chinese submarine shadowed the carrier as it entered the Taiwan Straits on its return voyage to Yokosuka, Japan. In the late fall of 2006, a Song-class submarine surfaced within torpedo range of the Kitty Hawk off the coast of Okinawa, Japan.

Despite the tensions, those episodes and the topic of submarines did not come up directly in conversations with Chinese officials in January, when the commander of Pacific Command, Adm. Timothy Keating, visited the nation.

“We watch them carefully. It’s an area of warfare at which they’re stretching a little bit,” he told reporters during a breakfast meeting in Washington, D.C. “Their numbers of submarines are increasing. The capabilities resident in those submarines are not unimpressive. They’re pretty good — we’re better.”

China’s fleet of nuclear and diesel submarines includes 10 Song class, 12 Kilo class, one Yuan class and 32 Romeo class.
“We know that they are continually expanding their reach in what they view as their own areas of interest, and that their submarine force is vital to expanding that reach,” says Locklear.

The proliferation of diesel submarines in the Pacific is one of the major factors behind the Navy’s decision to move six submarines from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet, says Rear Adm. Joseph Walsh, commander of the Pacific Submarine Force. Because more than 140 diesel subs are within reach of critical “choke points” in the area, anti-submarine warfare is Pacific Fleet’s top war-fighting priority, he adds.

The Navy saw its anti-submarine warfare skills diminish after the end of the Cold War. In those days, enemy Soviet nuclear submarines were noisy, and could be detected with passive sonar.

But modern-day diesel submarines are not as easily heard, particularly in regions of the seas where biological life and merchant shipping can camouflage their acoustic signatures. It is there, in the noisy waters of the littorals, where detecting submarines can be a cat-and-mouse game, Navy officials say.

Rear Adm. John Waickwicz, who was the head of the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command until he retired in January, says the Navy is looking at anti-submarine warfare in new ways.

“When you talk about countries that have 30, 40, or 50 submarines, you can’t wait until they’re around you, because they’re going to overwhelm you,” he says.

Potential enemies have figured that to defeat the U.S. Navy, they must “go out and buy submarines, and buy mines,” he says.

The mine and anti-submarine warfare command is calling for the deployment of a network of sonobuoys over a wide expanse of ocean to detect enemy submarines. But the project has been marred by technological and funding problems. The most significant hitch is that the data collected by the sensors takes too long to analyze, says Waickwicz. “You need to do it in real time to take action on it.”

False alarm rates on many of the fleet’s current detection technologies are too high, Waickwicz adds. That forces commanders to waste resources on non-existent threats.

Officials insist that the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities are the best in the business, but they acknowledge that it will take some time to hone the skills to combat stealthy diesel submarines. Waickwicz says that training has improved in recent years, but some individual units are not adequately prepared for at-sea operations.

For example, some units have demonstrated sonar operator proficiency on simulations that are not sophisticated enough to replicate the real environment, which puts the sailors at a disadvantage when they conduct operations at sea, says Rear Adm. Frank Drennan, the new commander of the Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command.

“The requirements are still the same — they just have to work on them in a challenging environment so that operators are truly proficient when they go to sea,” he says.

Hunting for quiet diesel submarines in the shallow waters of the littorals is akin to trying to identify the sound of a single car engine in the din of a major city, he says.

There are variations in the underwater topography, with sand bars, coral reefs and channels. Different depths of water and changing salinity and temperatures alter how sounds propagate. Marine life and merchant shipping also complicate the search by generating ambient noise.

The only technology that the Navy considers suitable for detecting and tracking diesel submarines is active sonar. It disperses signals out into the water where they bounce off of objects. Those echoes are captured by hydrophones and interpreted by sonar technicians.

Contrary to popular belief, sonar is not like radar, which gives complete visibility of “hits” in the air. What sonar technicians see is a screen that is filled with vertical lines representing echoes from objects in the water. Discerning which line is a submarine and which one is a coral reef is a difficult and complex task, sailors say.

The Navy spent 40 years building a training range on the coast of Southern California — one of the most extensive in the world, officials say. Underwater sensors track ships’ locations and record operations during exercises.

Because the water and ocean bottom conditions are representative of many areas around the world, the range is an ideal location for training strike groups in anti-submarine warfare, says Locklear.

But the Navy’s training there has been curtailed by ongoing litigation over the harmful effects of active sonar on marine mammals.

Under a federal judge’s ruling, ships were forbidden from using active sonar within 12 nautical miles of shore and had to steer clear of waters between the Santa Catalina and San Clemente islands during a joint training exercise in January for the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group. Sightings of marine mammals at certain distances also prompted ships to take protective measures, such as powering down sonar or shutting the sensors off completely.

“We’re not able to employ the sonar, given those restrictions, in a realistic manner, and it just makes it real tough to assess whether the fleet is proficient at using the technology,” says Capt. Pete Tomczak, deputy director for training at Third Fleet.

The use of sonar by the Navy has been linked to mass marine mammal strandings on beaches in the Bahamas and the Canary Islands. Pending necropsy results, the death of a northern right whale dolphin that washed up Jan. 29 on the Navy’s San Nicolas Island could be connected to sonar use.

Locklear says the Navy tries to balance its responsibility to protect the environment with its job to prepare sailors for war. He expresses concern that the judge’s ruling, if extrapolated beyond Southern California, could hamper Navy training around the world.

“If this becomes precedence setting, I think it will be very difficult for the United States Navy,” he says. “If there was a new technology on the horizon that made this irrelevant, we would be all over it. We just haven’t found it yet.”

With prospects of at-sea training diminishing, not only because of the litigation, but also as a result of rising fuel costs and other budget constraints, the Navy is searching for alternative ways to prepare its sailors for anti-submarine warfare.

One option is to rely on simulators, says Waickwicz. But he points out that current simulations in the Navy do not replicate sonar accurately.

“It’s like playing ‘Pong’ in today’s game world,” he says. While the submarine forces have higher fidelity trainers, much of the rest of the fleet — especially surface ships — have sub-par simulations.

“Computer simulations can only go so far. There is still no substitute for at-sea practice against a real submarine,” says Pacific Fleet’s Walsh.

Because the U.S. Navy no longer operates diesel-electric submarines, it invites allied countries that own these boats to participate in exercises at Navy ranges on the east and west coasts.

The Swedish Navy’s HMS Gotland collaborated most recently with various Navy commands in San Diego.

“It was very advantageous to have a diesel submarine crew for two years, to see how they thought, how they approached the issues to go against the ships,” says Waickwicz. “It really opened our eyes to diesel submarines and how active sonar is what you have to have in the strike group.”

The experience led to recent changes in the Navy’s anti-submarine warfare doctrine and tactics.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2008/APRIL/Pages/AntiSub2301.aspx

Continued in part two...

Respectfully,
Henry

Part Two of my response to BOZAKTWO1:

These are some of the specs of a "Song" class sub which was of the type that reportedly surfaced within the carrier group and raised some eybrows to say the least!:

'Song' class submarines (1+2 ships)
(Project 039)

Displacement: 2,250 tons submerged
Dimensions: 246 x 27.5 x 17.5 meters/807 x 90.2 x 57.4 feet
Propulsion: Diesel-electric, 3 or 4 MTU diesels, 1 shaft, approx. 22 knots
Crew: approx. 60
Sonar: unknown
Armament: 6 21 inch torpedo tubes

Concept/Program: A new Chinese-designed and -built diesel submarine. Production was reportedly planned at two per year starting in 1998, but it is expected that this will be slowed or cancelled in favor of Russian-built subs. The second unit has been badly delayed, and the first is reported to be unsatisfactory. Something fishy here with these specs! ;)

Builders: Wuhan SY.

Number   Year   FLT   Homeport   Notes
320   1998      
321         Building
322         Building

http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/china/submar.htm#ss

China's 'Increasing Naval Threat'
Norman Polmar | April 24, 2009
http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,189740,00.html

China's Navy -- officially the Peoples Liberation Army's Navy -- held an impressive naval review in the historic port city of Qingdao on 23 April, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA Navy. By any criteria, the event was a great success. Beyond a Chinese contingent of 2 nuclear and 2 diesel-electric submarines, 5 missile destroyers, and 6 frigates, there were 21 ships representing 14 other nations at the review. The U.S. Navy's contribution to the anniversary celebration was the Aegis missile destroyer Fitzgerald (DDG 62).

By the criteria of many American newspapers and, of course, bloggers, the event revealed the increasing "threat" to Western interests from China's Navy. Indeed, a Time magazine blog showed an Associated Press (AP) photo of a Chinese warship with the caption, "A Chinese navy soldier guards on a battleship at Quingdao port . . . ."  The photo, however, shows what is probably a frigate. China does not have any battleships; nor does any other nation.

Other articles -- some citing official Chinese statements indicating that aircraft carriers will be constructed "in the future" -- tell how the Chinese Navy is about to overtake the U.S. Navy, although by which measures is usually ignored. Indeed, one AP article declares that Chinese nuclear-propelled submarines "are considered just a notch below cutting-edge U.S. and Russian craft."

Reality is quite different.  First, simplistic numerical comparisons are too often misleading.  But quantity does provide a quality.  For example,

Nuclear aircraft carriers (CVN)
U.S. = 11    China = 0

VSTOL/helicopter carriers (LHA/LHD)
U.S. = 11    China = 0

Guided missile cruisers (CG)
U.S. = 22    China = 0

Destroyers (DDG/DD)
U.S. = 60    China = 27

Frigates (FF/FFG)
U.S. = 30    China = 48

Ballistic missile submarines (nuclear)(SSBN)
U.S. = 14    China = 3

Attack/cruiser missile submarines (nuclear)
(SSN/SSGN)
U.S. = 57    China = 6

Attack submarine (non-nuclear) (SS/SSK)
U.S. = 0     China = 55

Second, numbers alone to not convey an adequate comparison.  For example, each U.S. CVN-type carrier can operate 60 or more high-performance aircraft. All U.S. cruisers and destroyers have the Aegis advanced radar/fire control system; only a few Chinese ships have the equivalent. Similarly, all U.S. cruisers and destroyers have vertical-launch systems for firing long-range Tomahawk strike (land-attack) missiles as well as surface-to-air missiles. The Chinese have no ship-launched strike weapons and their surface-to-air missiles are inferior.

Further, there is no public evidence that the Chinese SSBNs have an operational missile, and none is known to have undertaken a long-range patrol. No long-range patrols have been reported of nuclear torpedo-attack submarines (SSN), and relatively few are made by diesel-electric undersea craft.

The one category in which the Chinese Navy does pose a potential threat to the U.S. Navy -- in this writer's opinion -- is in non-nuclear submarines. The Chinese Navy has modern, Russian-built Kilo (Project 877EKM) submarines as well indigenous-built diesel-electric submarines. An Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine program is underway.

The U.S. Navy's ability to detect these craft, especially in littoral areas is limited. This was demonstrated for two years when the U.S. Navy operated against a Swedish AIP submarine, the Gotland, "loaned" for anti-submarine exercises. According to the Swedish officers, the U.S. carrier battle groups operating against the Gotland off the southern California coast invariably failed to locate the craft.

Less is publicly known about the results/lessons of several South American diesel-electric submarines that periodically exercise with the U.S. Navy.

The Chinese Navy, supported by a large, land-based air arm and land-based anti-ship missiles, could most likely deny U.S. surface and air operations off of the lengthy Chinese coast, and in the Taiwan Strait.  At this time U.S. (nuclear) submarine operations in those areas appear to be feasible. Those submarines, armed with torpedoes, mobile mines, and Tomahawk missiles provide a considerable war-fighting capability.

But the most likely scenarios for a U.S.-Chinese conflict appear to be in Third World, resource-rich areas, such as Africa and South America. And today, and for the foreseeable future, the Chinese Navy cannot project meaningful political or military power to those distances.  To develop such a capability would take at least a decade, and most likely longer.

This from "Sinodefence.com":

Unconfirmed reports suggested that Shaanxi Diesel Manufactory is currently building the German MTU 16V-396 diesel under license. The same diesel is used to power the German Type 212 diesel-electric submarine.

Finally, this is from the Heritage foundation:

March 1, 2006
China's Submarine Challenge
by John J. Tkacik, Jr.
WebMemo #1001

Sea-power trends in the Pacific Ocean are ominous. By 2025, China’s navy could rule the waves of the Pacific. By some estimates, Chinese attack submarines will outnumber U.S. submarines in the Pacific by five to one and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile submarines will prowl America’s Western littoral, each closely tailed by two U.S. attack submarines that have better things to do. The United States, meanwhile, will likely struggle to build enough submarines to meet this challenge.

A misplaced diplomacy leaves some U.S. Navy commanders reluctant to admit publicly that China’s rapidly expanding submarine force in the Pacific is a threat, but if the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the latest Pentagon “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” (MPPRC Report) are any indication, they are undoubtedly thinking it. In a speech sponsored by the Asia Society in Washington earlier this month, for example, Admiral Gary Roughead, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, commented,

I’m always asked about the Chinese threat and I say, ‘It’s not a threat,’ because you have to have two things to have a threat, and that’s capability and intent. There is no question that the PLA navy is modernizing and building its capability and is moving very quickly, but what is the intent?

The Pentagon has already begun to answer this question, but it has yet to do so in a way that shows it takes this threat seriously.

China’s Intent

The QDR addresses the question of China’s intent:

Chinese military modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios. The pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is likely to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles…

According to the MPPRC Report’s executive summary, China’s specific intent is to “build counters to third-party, including potential U.S., intervention in [Taiwan] Strait crises.” The report continues, “Deterring, defeating, or delaying foreign intervention ahead of Taiwan’s capitulation is integral to Beijing’s strategy.” To this end, China is expanding its “force of ballistic missiles (long-range and short-range), cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems.”

China’s Sea-Power Goals

If they are curious about China’s intent, Pentagon planners might look to comments by General Wen Zongren, Political Commissar of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s elite Academy of Military Science. The MPPRC Report quotes General Wen as asserting that China must “break” the “blockade [by] international forces against China’s maritime security… Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China’s rise… [T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.” In fact, it is the explicit goal of the Chinese Communist Party to “increase the comprehensive strength of the nation.”

The Chinese navy—and its submarine fleet, in particular—is a key tool in achieving that goal. The September 2004 promotion of Admiral Zhang Dingfa, a career submariner, to Chief of Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and a full seat on the Central Military Commission was a clear signal of the primacy of submarine warfare in China’s strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.

Growing Submarine Force

Admiral Zhang led PLAN’s submarine modernization program and oversaw the acquisition of four modern Russian-built KILO subs, including the stealthy Type-636. Orders for eight more are on the books, with the first new boats to be delivered this month. That three Russian shipyards are at work to fill China’s orders for new submarines betrays this build-up’s urgency.

Admiral Zhang isn’t relying solely on the Russians. He has also increased production—to 2.5 boats per year—of China’s new, formidable Song-class diesel-electric submarine. China is also testing a new diesel-electric that the defense intelligence community has designated the “Yuan.” The Yuan is heavily inspired by Russian designs, including anechoic tile coatings and a super-quiet seven-blade screw. The addition of “air-independent propulsion,” which permits a submarine to operate underwater for up to 30 days on battery power, will make the Song and Yuan submarines virtually inaudible to existing U.S. surveillance networks—and even to U.S. subs.

These new submarines will be more lethal when armed with Russian SKVAL (“Squall”) torpedoes, which can reach 200 knots. There are reports that the SKVAL is already operational on some Chinese subs. As well, Russia has also transferred the Novator 3M-54E three-stage anti-ship cruise missile to China’s submarine fleet for use against aircraft carriers. Each Chinese KILO is armed with four of these missiles.

America’s Endangered Submarine Supremacy

In February 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented that the size of the Chinese fleet could surpass the United States Navy’s within a decade. “It is an issue that the department thinks about and is concerned about and is attentive to.” Indeed, the U.S. Navy will hold a series of major naval exercises in the Pacific this summer that will involve four aircraft carrier battle groups, including a carrier normally based on the U.S. East Coast. This will be the first time the Navy has deployed an Atlantic Fleet carrier to a Pacific exercise since the Vietnam War.

However, there is little indication that the Pentagon is taking the Chinese submarine challenge seriously. If it were, the QDR issued earlier this month would have recommended that the erosion of the U.S. submarine fleet come to an end.

But the QDR envisions a “return to a steady-state production rate of two attack submarines per year not later than 2012 while achieving an average per-hull procurement cost objective of $2.0 billion.” This means that the U.S. sub fleet will continue to decline for another six years, during which time America’s industrial base for constructing subs will further diminish and the per-unit cost of submarines will jump past $2 billion, impelling further cuts in the fleet.

Of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s 35 submarines (including three nuclear attack submarines based in Guam during 2006), about a dozen are underway at sea on operational duties at any one time. Under the QDR’s most optimistic estimates, Pacific Command’s sub fleet will diminish to about 30 by 2025.

Electric Boat (EB), the nation’s preeminent submarine contractor, has announced plans to lay off 900 of its 1,700 designers and marine draftsmen engineers over the next three years. This is a crisis. It will mark the first time in 50 years that the U.S. has not had a new submarine design on the drawing board. EB laid off nearly 200 submarine engineers and machinists in early February—and EB is the only shipbuilder in the nation that maintains submarine designers. As the build-rate for subs collapsed, EB used maintenance and repair work to pay designers’ salaries and maintain its staff of highly-skilled steelworkers. But without new orders, EB will lay off almost half of its workforce of over 5,000 over the next three years

U.S. Navy combatant commanders already require 150 percent of the attack submarine days currently available, and these requirements will only increase as the submarine force dwindles. If the United States allows production to dwindle further, expertise will be lost and costs will skyrocket for any new classes of submarines contemplated for the post-2012 period.

Meanwhile, China’s fleet of modern attack submarines is growing: China already has ten Song/Yuan/Kilo submarines in the Pacific today, over 50 older Ming-class and Romeo boats, five Han class nuclear attack submarines, and one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine. In addition, China has 25 new boats under contract now; 16 are under construction today, including a new class of nuclear attack submarine designated the Type-093 and a new nuclear ballistic missile sub, the Type-094.

The U.S. has three submarines under construction today. Although the Navy’s new 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for 48 nuclear attack submarines in the fleet by 2035, the Navy’s top submarine commander, Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, has testified before Congress that the Navy needs at least 54 boats to fulfill current critical missions. This number will rise as China’s navy expands.

If the Navy does not start launching new subs at the rate of two per year until several years after 2012, the force would dip to a low of 40 in 2028, or 17 percent below the Navy’s stated needs. And that rate will not even permit the Navy to reach its sub-minimal target of 48 attack submarines until 2034. All of this assumes that the Navy does not decommission ships faster than expected due to expanded operations in coming years.

Recommendations for the Administration and Congress

The United States must return to building at least two, and preferably two-and-a-half, new attack submarines per year beginning in FY 2009. The U.S. must begin procurement for long lead-time components, such as nuclear reactors, in FY 2007 and 2008. These steps are necessary just to hold U.S. subsurface strength steady.

The Administration should also work with key strategic partners in Asia to bolster their fleets. Japan and India are potential submarine warfare partners. Japan must also be encouraged to upgrade its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surveillance systems.

Congress should hold hearings into reports on the editorial pages of DefenseNews (February 13, 2006) and Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 15, 2006) that the U.S. Navy has sabotaged Taiwan’s efforts to procure modern diesel-electric boats from U.S. shipyards by hyper-inflating prices in order to keep U.S. yards from building anything but nuclear boats. A robust Taiwanese fleet would be a welcome relief as the U.S. Navy attempts to counter increasing Chinese sub-surface fleet pressures in Asian littoral waters. The United States and Japan also need an enhanced partnership with Taiwan in airborne and subsurface ASW reconnaissance and surveillance in waters under Taiwanese administration.

John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

This N.Y. Times articles clinches my hunch that the Russians are assisting the Chinese build up their submarine fleet:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/world/asia/07iht-subs.1.9826766.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1

Here's what they're supposed to look like:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3RjkaPn2qs

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOaFtMZ0aKc

Not all is lost because, this is what Taiwan and the US is countering this threat with:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/hai-lung-2.htm

Btw, here's an interesting article or two, three, or four... Okay! I'll stop at five ;) :

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE09Df02.html

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JE09Df02.html

http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_11_20_06.htm

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492804/The-uninvited-guest-Chinese-sub-pops-middle-U-S-Navy-exercise-leaving-military-chiefs-red-faced.html

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/04/observing-pentagon-report-on-china.html

Finally, this is the DOD's Annual report on China's Military Power for 2009:

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf

So, I agree that we need to counter the Chinese threat as well as the one by Iran with their purchases of Russian Advanced & updated Kilo class Subs... We also need to look at what the Russian Bear is up to these days as well since that sc*mbag Chavez is also in the process of replacing cuba as the main troublemaker in our own backyard. :) :) :)

Respectfully,
Henry

you have soundly supported although unintentionally, that all of this cannot be a serious of unfortunate events but a well choreographed play to bring about the new world order.
im gonna start doing yoga so i can kiss my own ass goodbye.
although there are many waking up, its gonna be a close match as to whether we make it, the throngs are still sleepwalking and dangerous.