Inspection Trends / Fall 2011 9 change requires completion of a recalibration, defect detection and sizing capabilities are not optimum. In addition, operators are exposed to a certain amount of radiation during installation. TWI’s prototype uses 128 piezoelectric elements placed in a circular formation. The automatic robot assembly will carry a novel matrix phased array probe that will be combined with 3-D beam steering to enable a large area of the weld to be inspected in a single operation. The design is currently undergoing final testing. Additional information is available at www.nozzleinspect.eu. Former Shipyard Worker Sentenced for False Certifications Robert Raymond Ruks of Portsmouth, Va., was sentenced in August to 37 months in prison, followed by a term of three years supervised release for making false statements to Navy officials and federal agents. He falsely certified that he had inspected welds on the hulls of Navy ships and submarines. Subsequent inspections found certain welds on these vessels to be defective. “Lying on weld inspection reports is a dangerous crime that threatens the safety of our men and women who serve in the U.S. Navy,” said U.S. Attorney Neil H. MacBride. “Because of his lies, the Navy and its shipbuilding partners had to conduct a thorough technical review and reinspection of the affected vessels to ensure the ships’ safety. My office is committed to ensuring that government contractors are held responsible when they attempt to defraud the government and put our Navy personnel in danger.” According to court documents, Ruks worked for Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Newport News, Va., as a NDT inspector. He admitted to his supervisors on May 14, 2009, that he had falsely certified he had inspected three lift pad welds on a Navy submarine when in fact he had not. Ruks was later questioned by agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and, although he admitted the false certifications of the lift pad welds, he lied to the agents regarding the number of other ship and submarine hulls he had failed to inspect. NCIS determined Ruks had been falsely certifying weld inspections on various hulls from 2007 through 2009. Based upon archived inspection reports, Northrop Grumman officials estimated Ruks performed approximately 9500 weld inspections on as many as six submarines that he certified in the company’s electronic records system. A reinspection of all the welds Ruks had certified revealed that 14 structural welds and two pipe welds (one of which was a SUBSAFE, critical weld) were determined to be defective/unsatisfactory. There were also a considerable number of welds Ruks certified that were labeled as “inaccessible” due to their location. The reinspections required 18,906 worker hours, which included the correction of the defective weld joints, at a cost of approximately $654,000. A search of American Welding Society records revealed Ruks has never been a Certified Welding Inspector. ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ���������������������������������� See Us At The FABTECH booth #6200
Inspection Trends - October 2011 - Fall
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