The EOR has a responsibility to review the detailed fabrication drawings to ensure the structural integrity is not degradated by the connections or slices joining members together. This principle as underscored after the walkway collapse at the Hyatt Regency in Kansas City.

The following excerpt is taken from a webpage I found on the subject. 

ENGINEERING ETHICS

The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse

Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering
Texas A&M University
NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252

Negligence And The Professional "Debate" Over Responsibility For Design

Instructor's Guide - Introduction To The Case

On July 17, 1981, the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, held a videotaped tea-dance party in their atrium lobby. With many party-goers standing and dancing on the suspended walkways, connections supporting the ceiling rods that held up the second and fourth-floor walkways across the atrium failed, and both walkways collapsed onto the crowded first-floor atrium below. The fourth-floor walkway collapsed onto the second-floor walkway, while the offset third-floor walkway remained intact. As the United States' most devastating structural failure, in terms of loss of life and injuries, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse left 114 dead and in excess of 200 injured. In addition, millions of dollars in costs resulted from the collapse, and thousands of lives were adversely affected.

The hotel had only been in operation for approximately one year at the time of the walkways collapse, and the ensuing investigation of the accident revealed some unsettling facts:

During January and February, 1979, the design of the hanger rod connections was changed in a series of events and disputed communications between the fabricator (Havens Steel Company) and the engineering design team (G.C.E. International, Inc., a professional engineering firm). The fabricator changed the design from a one-rod to a two-rod system to simplify the assembly task, doubling the load on the connector, which ultimately resulted in the walkways collapse.1
The fabricator, in sworn testimony before the administrative judicial hearings after the accident, claimed that his company (Havens) telephoned the engineering firm (G.C.E.) for change approval. G.C.E. denied ever receiving such a call from Havens.2
On October 14, 1979 (more than one year before the walkways collapsed), while the hotel was still under construction, more than 2700 square feet of the atrium roof collapsed because one of the roof connections at the north end of the atrium failed.3 In testimony, G.C.E. stated that on three separate occasions they requested on-site project representation during the construction phase; however, these requests were not acted on by the owner (Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation), due to additional costs of providing on-site inspection.4
Even as originally designed, the walkways were barely capable of holding up the expected load, and would have failed to meet the requirements of the Kansas City Building Code.5
Due to evidence supplied at the Hearings, a number of principals involved lost their engineering licenses, a number of firms went bankrupt, and many expensive legal suits were settled out of court. The case serves as an excellent example of the importance of meeting professional responsibilities, and what the consequences are for professionals who fail to meet those responsibilities. This case is particularly serviceable for use in structural design, statics and materials classes, although it is also useful as a general overview of consequences for professional actions. The Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse provides a vivid example of the importance of accuracy and detail in engineering design and shop drawings (particularly regarding revisions), and the costly consequences of negligence in this realm.

The fabricator has a part to play, obviously a very important part to play, in the construction of a steel framed structure. If and when a member is not continuous due to construction constrains that were not apparent to the structural engineer, i.e., the EOR, the fabricator has a responsibility to let the EOR know of the condition and to obtain approval for any changes, deviations, etc. that are a departure from the structural design drawing. The inspector also has an important part in the orchestrated chaos. He should inform the EOR of any nonconformances or changes to the structural design that are not signed off (approved) by he EOR by means of stamped revisions, sketches, etc. Only those changes approved by the EOR should be permitted and accepted by the inspector, whether he works for the fabricator or the owner as a TPI.

It is not the inspector's responsibility, or the TPI agency, to approve changes made by the fabricator. In the context of construction here in the United States, only the EOR has the authority to approve changes to the structural design. I have been called in on jobs where the inspector or his employer, who had a P.E. on staff, approved changes that the EOR was not aware of. In one case, that TPI agency is no longer in business.

The direct response to your inquiry is that the question should be directed to the EOR. It is not a decision the inspector should be making. Any splice in the main member or attachments should be shown on the detailed drawing that has been reviewed and approved by the EOR.

I have seen designs that used the bent plates to increase the moment of inertia for bending loads. I've been on other projects were the bent plates carried only the masonry and were not considered in sizing the beam.  In the first case the butt joints in bent plate had to have complete joint penetration groove welds and in the second case the butt joints were simple intermitent welds. In each case the detail was reviewed and approved by the EOR.

Best regards - Al