>During the conference call, Shaw Group executives focused on the differences between the AP1000 design and the boiling water reactors used at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Jeffrey Merrifield, a senior vice president for Shaw's Power Group and former NRC commissioner (1998-2007), explained that one of the primary differences between the reactors is the AP1000's ability to maintain spent fuel at a reasonable temperature for about 72 hours without power. In the event of a power failure, a passive, closed-loop system would condense the steam coming from the reactor, allowing the steam to cool and condense, returning the water to the reactor by a gravity-fed system.
>In addition, an approximately 250,000-gallon water storage tank is situated on top of the containment. This water can be released on the outside of the containment to lower temperatures, and consequently pressure, inside of the containment. The AP1000 can also can house a special hydrogen-ignition system, which, if a buildup of hydrogen occurred within the containment, could burn off the hydrogen, avoiding a buildup of the gas, which is what caused the explosion at Fukushima Daiichi.
>Shaw Group CEO J.M. Bernhard emphasized that the AP1000's passive cooling technology, which can sustain itself for a limited time without power, is the type of technology needed for the global expansion of nuclear power. "No other technology has that capability," said Bernhard. "It will be the technology that is certainly preferred over all other technologies going forward in light of the information that we have in Japan."
>Merrifield made a few predictions about what regulations the NRC may pass in regard to nuclear power stations:
>Seismic strengthening of existing units: Referring to the incident in Japan, Merrifield said, "I think the media has gotten this somewhat backwards. The reactors really did quite well relative to seismic activity. It was the tsunami that was really the effect. That notwithstanding, I think we'll see further hardening of piping systems to make sure that hydrogen gas is bled off and you don't have the possibility of pooling in a containment and potential explosion."
>Installation of hydrogen combiners and re-igniters. While the NRC doesn't currently require these in reactor designs, Merrifield sees the possibility that this could be a future requirement.
>Tsunami analysis and upgrades. Such enhancements could include protection of oil-storage tanks, weatherproofing of electrical systems and flood barriers.
>Expanded battery backup requirements. Merrifield noted that battery backup at the Japanese sites lasted only about eight hours.
>Potential expansion of emergency evacuation zones
>Centralized locations for emergency backup equipment. "One of the things that we did in the United States after the Exxon Valdez accident was there was a congressionally imposed requirement for the oil industry to set up a series of locations in the United States where emergency response equipment could be located," said Merrifield. "It's certainly plausible. That may be something that we as a country may look at. Can you pre-stage diesel generators, emergency cable systems, things of that nature to make it easier to respond to an incident if indeed it occurred?"
>Referring to U.S. nuclear projects under way, Bernhard seemed uncertain about the immediate future of the South Texas Project near Bay City, Texas, but was more optimistic about construction of Vogtle units 3 and 4 in Georgia and the V.C. Summer units 2 and 3 project in South Carolina. Referring to the Vogtle project, Bernhard said, "Nothing has stopped. We are still moving. We have full notice to proceed; we continue to buy equipment and move forward on the site. That project is a very significant one for us, and we see the work being done presently." Bernhard said that SCANA Corporation's (NYSE:SCG) (Cayce, South Carolina) Summer project "continues to move forward as well."
>The CEO's tone was slightly more reserved in regard to NRG Energy Incorporated's (NYSE:NRG) (Princeton, New Jersey) South Texas Project: "The South Texas Project is basically on hold doing very, very little work. This project is certainly going to go into thorough review. It is doubtful in my opinion that TEPCO will be able to supply equity, et cetera, for the project. They haven't made that announcement. It's very, very doubtful in my mind that they'll be able to move forward on that project." Tokyo Electric Power Company Incorporated (TYO:9501) (TEPCO) (Tokyo, Japan), the owner and operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, is a major stakeholder in the project. For additional information, see March 25, 2011, article - Exelon Corporation: 'Our Plants Are Safe'.
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